After christening the new year with a hard-fought victory at Stones River, the Federal war effort in Middle Tennessee stalled during the first several months of 1863. The Union Army of the Cumberland\u201460,000 strong under Major General William S. Rosecrans\u2014remained in winter quarters well through the spring thaw, while Braxton Bragg\u2019s Confederate Army of Tennessee (roughly 43,000 troops) strengthened their defenses along the Duck River. The War Department, impatient with Rosecrans\u2019 inaction, urged the commander to move against Bragg as Major General Ulysses S. Grant prepared his Vicksburg Campaign. Though initially disinclined, Rosecrans contrived a brilliant tactical operation known as the Tullahoma Campaign. Between June 23 and July 4, 1863, the Army of the Cumberland performed a precise sequence of feints and flanking maneuvers around the Confederate right, disrupting Bragg\u2019s communication and supply lines to the southeast. One particularly destructive raid by Colonel John T. Wilder\u2019s mounted infantry in Decherd compelled Bragg to evacuate his Tullahoma headquarters and withdraw his bewildered army towards Chattanooga\u2014a burgeoning transportation center that serviced four major railroads and ferryboat traffic along the navigable Tennessee River. For the Confederacy, losing Chattanooga would ruin wartime logistics and simultaneously endanger its industrial heartland to Federal invasion. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n The rugged wilderness surrounding Chattanooga complicated the Union army\u2019s overland offensive. Dense underbrush and mountainous terrain confined military operations to narrow wagon roads insufficient for large-scale military maneuvers and supply trains. Faced with these obstacles, Rosecrans devised a three-pronged approach: Major General Thomas L. Crittenden\u2019s XXI Corps would aggressively mobilize towards the embattled city while two other columns\u2014the XIV and XX Corps respectively commanded by Major Generals George H. Thomas and Alexander McCook\u2014flanked southwest into northeast Alabama. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n Between August 16 and September 8, Federal forces trekked across the formidable Cumberland Plateau. Concurrent with (albeit independent of) Rosecrans\u2019 advance, <\/span>Major General Ambrose Burnside<\/span><\/u><\/a>\u2019s Union Army of the Ohio campaigned against Knoxville, Tennessee, capturing the city on September 3. The fall of Knoxville and Crittenden\u2019s rapid approach convinced Bragg that an attack was imminent from the north. The Confederate commander arranged his forces east of Chattanooga, leaving the lower Tennessee River crossings practically unguarded. Consequently, Rosecrans traversed the Tennessee unopposed, which exposed the weakened Confederate rear to attack. Realizing he had once again been outmaneuvered, Bragg was compelled to evacuate Chattanooga without a fight. Crittenden\u2019s corps took possession of the city on September 9, 1863. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n Chattanooga\u2019s capitulation seemed demoralizing for the Confederate war effort, but Bragg saw a chance at retaliation. The three columns of Rosecrans\u2019 army were separated across a forty-mile front\u2014their ranks overextended for mutual support across the hostile landscape. If Bragg could concentrate his forces and separately engage the isolated Union contingents, he could destroy the Army of the Cumberland. But first, the Confederates had to garner numerical superiority. From his encampment in Lafayette, Georgia, Bragg recalled Major General Simon Bolivar Buckner\u2019s 8,000-man corps from Knoxville and requested all available support from peripheral Confederate commands. General Joseph E. Johnston dispatched 9,000 men from his Department of the West\u2014two divisions commanded by Major Generals <\/span>John C. Breckinridge<\/span><\/u><\/a> and W.H.T. Walker. Two additional brigades under Generals John Gregg and Evader McNair followed, adding 2,500 more rebels to Bragg\u2019s army. General Robert E. Lee, commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, transferred Lieutenant General James Longstreet\u2019s corps (approximately 15,000 troops) to Bragg\u2019s Army of Tennessee\u2014these reinforcements traveled nearly eight hundred miles in two weeks along Southern railways. By mid-September, the Confederate army numbered over 65,000 men.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n Bragg dispatched \u201cdeserters\u201d to Union lines, spreading rumors that the Confederates were hopelessly demoralized and retreating further into Georgia. An overconfident Rosecrans hastily organized an aggressive pursuit. He ordered McCook\u2019s cavalry to break the Confederate supply line in Resaca, Crittenden to maintain possession of Chattanooga, and Thomas\u2019s corps to advance towards Lafayette. Major General James Negley\u2019s division\u2014Thomas’s advance guard numbering 4,600 men\u2014was ordered to cross McLemore\u2019s Cove and secure Dug Gap. Negley\u2019s maneuver into McLemore\u2019s Cove would leave his squadron vulnerable and isolated within the natural bottleneck. A timely attack from the northeast would all but ensure the division\u2019s destruction. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n On the evening of September 9, Bragg mobilized Major General Thomas C. Hindman\u2019s command towards Davis\u2019s Crossroads, approaching Negley\u2019s left flank. He also directed Lieutenant General D.H. Hill to reinforce Hindman\u2019s assault from the east at Dug Gap with Major General Patrick Cleburne\u2019s division; however, insubordination and hesitancy undermined Bragg\u2019s meticulous plan. Hill outright neglected his assignment with dubious reasoning\u2014Cleburne was sick and he had insufficient time to properly execute the maneuver. Both explanations were later disproven. When Hindman (whose men were positioned three miles from Negley) learned of Hill\u2019s absence, he became overly cautious and refused to progress any further. An infuriated Bragg dispatched Buckner\u2019s Corps to support Hindman that evening. Despite outnumbering the Federals three-to-one, Confederate field leadership decided that Bragg\u2019s plan was impractical. The arrival of Absalom Baird\u2019s division on September 11 allowed Negley\u2019s men to safely withdraw. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n The Confederates lost the element of surprise at Davis\u2019s Crossroads. Rosecrans\u2014fully aware of the grave situation his divided army faced\u2014immediately ordered his columns to reunite. He directed General Gordon Granger\u2019s Reserve Corps to Chattanooga while the XXI and XIV Corps maneuvered twelve miles south towards Lee and Gordon\u2019s Mills. By September 17, all three Federal contingents were within supporting distance of each other. Bragg made little effort to disrupt this Union consolidation. Instead, the rebel commander drafted an ambitious battle plan to cross Chickamauga Creek, scatter the Federals back into the mountains, and reoccupy Chattanooga. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n The Battle of Chickamauga: September 19 \u2013 20, 1863<\/span><\/u><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n The Confederate Army of Tennessee approached Chickamauga Creek during the early morning hours of September 18. Around 7:30 am, Bragg\u2019s advance guard\u2014five infantry brigades under General Bushrod Johnson and supporting cavalry from General Nathan Bedford Forrest\u2014began skirmishing at Reed\u2019s Bridge against three Union infantry regiments commanded by Colonel Robert Minty. Although outnumbered by nearly eight times their strength, Minty\u2019s 3,000-man command successfully repelled several Confederate crossing attempts until mid-afternoon. This delaying action provided Rosecrans precious time to extend his battlelines north and protect direct routes of retreat toward Chattanooga. Both armies maneuvered along the banks of Chickamauga Creek throughout the night, neither knowing where the other was positioned. The heavily timbered area\u2014overgrown with vegetative brambles and cedar thickets\u2014prevented efficient movement and reconnoitering operations. Many officers had difficulty keeping in touch with their own commands. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n \u201cMen were lying where they fell, shot in every conceivable part of the body. Some with their entrails torn <\/span><\/em><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n out and still hanging to them and piled up on the ground beside them, and they still alive. Some with their <\/span><\/em><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n jaw torn off, and hanging by a fragment of skin to their cheeks, with their tongues lolling from their mouth, <\/span><\/em><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n and they trying to talk.\u201d <\/span><\/em><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n \u2013 Sam Watkins, 1st Tennessee Infantry, CSA <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n The Battle of Chickamauga opened on the morning of September 19, when soldiers from General Thomas\u2019s XIV Corps engaged Forrest\u2019s dismounted Confederate cavalry near Jay\u2019s Mill. Both Rosecrans and Bragg stubbornly fed brigades into the fray as the crescendo of battle intensified. By mid-afternoon, the general engagement sprawled across a four-mile front. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n Around 3 pm, at the southern end of the battlefield, Confederate forces achieved a momentary breakthrough in the Union line. Colonel George P. Buell\u2014commanding General Thomas Wood\u2019s Union brigade\u2014was attacked by Brigadier General Evander Law\u2019s division north of the Viniard House. Buell\u2019s retreat imperiled Union possession of the strategic Lafayette Road, but the timely arrival of Northern reinforcements (namely Colonel John T. Wilder\u2019s \u201cLightning Brigade\u201d) quickly reestablished control. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n At 6 pm, Bragg directed Cleburne\u2019s division to support the Confederate right flank\u2014comprehensively commanded by Lieutenant General Leonidas Polk\u2014which had seen only sporadic action since late morning. As the Georgia sun set, Cleburne ambushed Brigadier General Richard W. Johnson\u2019s regiments guarding Alexander Bridge Road. The unanticipated nature of Cleburne\u2019s attack and low visibility propagated chaos through the Union ranks. Federal reinforcements from Baird\u2019s division rushed to support the front, but were mistakenly subjected to friendly fire. The tide of battle abated shortly after 9 pm with Cleburne\u2019s Confederates in possession of the battleground. Baird and Johnson\u2019s troops retreated to General Thomas\u2019s new fortified defensive line along Lafayette Road. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n With the day\u2019s hostilities discontinued, little progress could be appreciated on either side. Bragg had failed to crush the Union army and Rosecrans remained in possession of Chattanooga. However, the prospects of victory substantially improved for the Confederacy when the entirety of Longstreet\u2019s Corps arrived late that evening. Bragg reorganized his command into two wings\u2014Longstreet leading the left and Polk on the right\u2014and prepared to execute his endgame attack. Rosecrans anticipated Bragg\u2019s intent and quietly shifted troops towards his vulnerable left flank, although the Army of the Cumberland was now outnumbered by nearly eight thousand men.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n \u201cChickamauga is as fatal a name in our history as Bull Run\u2026It was wholesale panic.\u201d <\/span><\/em><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n \u2013 U.S. Assistant Secretary of War Charles A. Dana <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n Bragg planned to strike at dawn. Polk would attack first, driving the Union line south where Longstreet would roll up Rosecrans\u2019 right flank. D.H. Hill\u2019s corps was tasked to spearhead the initial assault, but Polk made a lackadaisical effort to deliver Hill his orders. Hill was ultimately informed around 6 am. With such little preparation time, Hill issued his men breakfast rations and petitioned to delay the attack. Bragg reluctantly agreed. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n The Confederate right finally lurched forward around 9:30 am. By then, the Federals had strengthened their lines with wooden breastworks, diminishing Bragg\u2019s opportunity for success. Major General John C. Breckenridge\u2019s division was the first to strike the Union fortifications, producing costly results. Additional rebel units joined as the action spread southward, but the Union line held firm against their piecemeal attacks. The ill-advised series of calamitous Confederate charges ended around noon. Upon witnessing his army\u2019s futile effort, Bragg remarked, \u201c[W]e have lost the opportunity of crushing Rosecrans and retaking Chattanooga\u2026I am not responsible for it and will not bear it.\u201d<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n While Rosecrans successfully bolstered his left flank, one of his staff officers mistakenly reported that Brigadier General John M. Brannan\u2019s division had withdrawn from the line, creating a gap in the right-center that exposed Major General Joseph J. Reynold\u2019s division to attack. Without any further reconnaissance, a mentally exhausted Rosecrans ordered General Thomas Wood to \u201cclose up on Reynolds as fast as possible and support him.\u201d However, no such hole existed, and this impulsive adjustment actually created a quarter-mile opening with Wood\u2019s redeployment. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n Purely by coincidence, at 11:10 am, Longstreet amassed five Confederate battalions and struck precisely where the hole developed. The attack surprised the Federal divisions, many of whom were in motion and unprepared to fight. The Union center and right crumbled in disorder, sweeping away corps commanders Crittenden and McCook. Rosecrans, himself, proceeded to evacuate the battlefield for Chattanooga, where he sought to reassemble the shattered remnants of his once-triumphant army. The premature departure of Union leadership placed Major General George H. Thomas in field command of the Cumberland\u2019s residual forces. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n General Thomas posted his XIV Corps upon Horseshoe Ridge and rallied remnants of the Federal army to resist Longstreet\u2019s pursuit. Colonel Ferdinand Van Derveer\u2019s brigade and Gordon Granger\u2019s Reserves were the first to arrive, establishing makeshift breastworks on Snodgrass Hill. Additional reinforcements filtered in until 25,000 Union soldiers occupied Thomas\u2019s final line of defense. For five hours, the Southerners hammered away, but the determined Federals furiously resisted each blow. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n When Rosecrans\u2019s chief-of-staff (and future President) James A. Garfield arrived with orders to retreat, Thomas stubbornly refused. An impressed Garfield dispatched a message to Union command, stating Thomas was \u201cstanding like a rock.\u201d The Union army continued its resilient defense against Longstreet until nightfall. Under cover of darkness, the Federals withdrew to Chattanooga in relatively good order; however, Baird\u2019s division, acting as Thomas\u2019s rear guard, was subjected to considerable Confederate harassment. With little coordination and depleted ammunition, three of Baird\u2019s regiments\u2014the 22nd Michigan, 89th Ohio, and 21st Ohio\u2014were forced to surrender. While the victorious Confederates held the field, Thomas\u2019s successful defense prevented the fall of Chattanooga and annihilation of the Army of the Cumberland. General Thomas\u2019s valor earned him the nickname \u201cthe Rock of Chickamauga\u201d. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n Chickamauga\u2014the \u201cRiver of Death\u201d according to Cherokee translation\u2014had earned its nickname. Almost 124,000 men engaged in this battle, resulting in more than 34,000 casualties\u2014the biggest and bloodiest battle of the Western Theater. Only Gettysburg witnessed more bloodshed during the entire American Civil War. The Confederates suffered 18,454 casualties (2,312 killed, 14,674 wounded, and 1,468 missing) while the Union lost 16,170 men (1,657 killed, 9,756 wounded, and 4,757 missing). Both armies lost roughly 28% of their available force. Four brigade commanders were killed on each side, including Confederate General Benjamin Helm, President Abraham Lincoln\u2019s brother-in-law. Union corps commanders McCook and Crittenden were court-martialed for their poor performances on the battlefield (the latter also faced allegations of drunkenness on duty) and subsequently relieved of their positions.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n Though a resounding Confederate victory, the Battle of Chickamauga was incomplete. The Union army had been driven from the battlefield but not destroyed. Confederate cavalry commander Nathan Bedford Forrest urged an aggressive pursuit of the enemy, but Bragg deferred, sensing no urgency. The Army of Tennessee camped for the night, replenishing their supplied and reorganizing order, unaware that the Union army had slipped from their grasp.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n The Battles for Chattanooga: November 23 \u2013 25, 1863<\/span><\/u><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n The Confederate army shattered Rosecrans\u2019 command at Chickamauga; however, Bragg failed to capitalize on the rout. Instead, he expended his energy against \u201cdetractors\u201d within the Army of Tennessee immediately after the battle\u2014a fatal hesitancy that enabled Union leadership to consolidate defensive positions around Chattanooga. Bragg regularly projected his acerbic temperament onto subordinate officers and rarely took accountability for his army\u2019s failures. Unsurprisingly, these behaviors effected endemic dissatisfaction and insubordination among Confederate ranks. General Longstreet, who witnessed Bragg\u2019s conduct at Chickamauga, remarked, \u201cI am convinced that nothing but the hand of God can save us or help us as long as we have our present commander.\u201d On October 4, President Jefferson Davis visited the Army of Tennessee and received complaints from twelve senior generals chastising Bragg\u2019s ineffective leadership. Ultimately, Davis sustained Bragg, who retaliated against his conspirators. Generals Hill, Polk, and Buckner were consequently removed from field command. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n The Confederates besieged Chattanooga, hoping to starve out its Northern occupiers. Rebel artillery positioned atop Lookout Mountain\u2014an 85-mile-long ridge that culminated at a sharp point 1,800 feet above Chattanooga\u2014domineered access to the Tennessee River while Major General Joseph Wheeler\u2019s Confederate cavalry routinely raided vulnerable Union supply trains. With no incoming provisions, forty thousand Federal soldiers were placed on a starvation diet\u2014limited to a quarter ration per day. Famine killed tens of thousands of horses and mules. Chattanooga\u2019s remaining citizens, clamped between the jaws of combat, were subjected to martial law, property confiscation and destruction, and the constant threat of bombardment. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n As the situation in Chattanooga grew increasingly dire, Washington war officials frantically organized relief efforts. In the immediate hours after Chickamauga, Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton ordered <\/span>Major General Joseph Hooker<\/span><\/u><\/a> to lead the XI and XII Corps\u201420,000 men from the Army of the Potomac\u2014to Chattanooga. Even before the sanguineous engagement, General-in-Chief Henry Halleck had instructed Major Generals Ulysses S. Grant and William Tecumseh Sherman to reinforce Rosecrans from their encampments in Vicksburg, Mississippi; however, these orders were not received until two days after Chickamauga. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n On October 17, 1863, President Abraham Lincoln appointed General Grant to head the newly established Military Division of the Mississippi, which effectively conferred authority over all Union forces west of the Appalachians. In the days that followed, Grant learned that Rosecrans\u2014unnerved from his army\u2019s predicament\u2014was planning to withdraw from Chattanooga, thereby surrendering the strategic city to Bragg. Exercising his newfound authority, Grant relieved Rosecrans of command on October 19 and replaced him with General George H. Thomas. When ordered to hold Chattanooga, Thomas dutifully replied, \u201cwe will hold the town till we starve.\u201d<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n When Grant reached Chattanooga on October 23, Brigadier General William F. \u201cBaldy\u201d Smith\u2014Chief Engineer for the Army of the Cumberland\u2014presented a daring proposal to secure lasting provisions for the city\u2019s beleaguered Union forces. This plan of necessity tasked General William B. Hazen\u2019s 1,500-man brigade to float down the Tennessee River on pontoons towards Brown\u2019s Ferry during the night of October 26-27, while a second brigade under General John B. Turchin marched across Moccasin Point to support the amphibious landings. By seizing Brown\u2019s Ferry, Union riverboats could connect with Hooker\u2019s approaching force at Bridgeport, Alabama, thereby establishing a reliable supply route (\u201cThe Cracker Line\u201d) through Lookout Valley. Grant enthusiastically submitted his approval.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n On October 27, around 3 am, Hazen\u2019s brigade silently floated down the Tennessee River, stealthily passing by unsuspecting Confederate sentries on Lookout Mountain. Upon landing at Brown\u2019s Ferry, Union troops scattered sparse rebel pickets before erecting more sophisticated fortifications. The 15th Alabama Infantry launched a counterattack around 5 am, but were decisively repulsed. News of the action passed to General Longstreet, who presumptuously dismissed its importance\u2014Longstreet was under the unconfirmed impression that Brown\u2019s Ferry was a feint for a larger Federal maneuver south of Lookout Mountain. When Bragg inevitably learned of the Union operation, he ordered Longstreet to retake Brown\u2019s Ferry, but Longstreet again demurred, oblivious to its tactical significance. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n The following morning, Hooker\u2019s column appeared in Lookout Valley, much to the astonishment of Confederate field leadership. Longstreet, now acutely cognizant of his dismissive miscalculations, hurriedly mobilized his men against the developing Union maneuver. He devised a plan for a nighttime assault\u2014a relatively rare occurrence during the Civil War\u2014in which General Micah Jenkins\u2019s South Carolina Brigade (1,800 men actively commanded by Colonel John Bratton) would attack Brigadier General John W. Geary\u2019s isolated division at Wauhatchie Station. The brigades of Generals Evander Law and Jerome Robertson would position themselves on the high ground overlooking Brown\u2019s Ferry to prevent the XI Corps from reinforcing Hooker\u2019s rear guard. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n While Longstreet\u2019s scheme was scheduled for 10:00 pm, logistical confusion delayed the operation until midnight. The sudden Confederate attack took Geary\u2019s men completely by surprise. Nonetheless, competent Union officers quickly reestablished order and fiercely defended their bivouac. Upon hearing the sounds of battle, Hooker dispatched Major General Oliver O. Howard and two XI Corps divisions to support Geary; however, Hooker\u2019s orders of march were vague and Howard\u2019s troops wound up engaging Law and Robertson\u2019s brigades. The outnumbered Confederates repulsed several vigorous Union assaults against their naturally defensible hilltop positions. At Wauhatchie, Bratton received an erroneous dispatch from Jenkins containing details of an approaching Union column\u2014Howard\u2019s XI Corps currently engaged at Brown\u2019s Ferry\u2014and recommendations to retreat. The South Carolinian obliged and withdrew his men back up Lookout Mountain. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n Though the Battle of Wauhatchie was a relatively small engagement, the night fight had significant ramifications for the military situation around Chattanooga. The Confederates were unable to dislodge Geary from Brown\u2019s Ferry, thereby yielding Lookout Valley to the Union. This opened the wagon roads and Tennessee River to supply depots in Bridgeport, thus easing the supply crisis in Chattanooga. With provisions and reinforcements flowing through the \u201cCracker Line,\u201d the Confederate siege was rendered ineffectual. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n On the evening of November 15, General Sherman arrived in Chattanooga. He met with Grant\u2019s council of war and discussed strategies to break the Confederate siege. It was decided that Sherman\u2019s troops would march north of Chattanooga, feigning towards Knoxville then attacking Bragg\u2019s right flank on Missionary Ridge. Thomas\u2019s men would simultaneously mobilize against the Confederate center while Hooker assaulted the rebel left flank on Lookout Mountain, blocking Bragg\u2019s route of retreat at Rossville Gap. Grant tentatively approved the plan but reassigned Hooker\u2019s role to merely maintain possession of Lookout Valley. The mass of his attack rested with Sherman. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n While the Federals schemed in early November, Bragg rearranged his defenses: Lieutenant General William J. Hardee controlled the Confederate right flank at Tunnel Hill, Major General John C. Breckinridge\u2019s Corps centered itself along Missionary Ridge, and General Carter Stevenson protected Lookout Mountain. Bragg assumed Sherman\u2019s intent was Knoxville, though without adequate cavalry, the Confederate commander had little utility to confirm his suspicions. He ordered Longstreet to march against Burnside\u2019s Army of the Ohio in East Tennessee, taking with him the divisions of Major Generals Lafayette McLaws and John B. Hood, Joseph Wheeler\u2019s cavalry brigades, and the artillery battalions of Colonel E. Porter Alexander\u2014approximately 15,000 men in total. Longstreet\u2019s redeployment removed nearly half of the available manpower from Missionary Ridge. With only 16,000 troops remaining along a five mile front, the Confederates ranks were stretched thin. This limited manpower was further exasperated on November 22, when Bragg ordered Major Generals Patrick Cleburne and Simon Buckner to withdraw their divisions (totaling 11,000 men) and support Longstreet\u2019s campaign in Knoxville. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n NOVEMBER 23: ORCHARD KNOB<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n On November 23, 1863, General Thomas\u2019s Army of the Cumberland emerged from Fort Wood and assembled parade-like formations directly east of Chattanooga: Brigadier General Absalom Baird manned the left, Thomas Wood\u2019s division possessed the center, and <\/span>Major General Philip Sheridan<\/span><\/u><\/a> held the right. Confederate sentries stationed on Orchard Knob\u2014a topographic prominence midway between Chattanooga and Missionary Ridge\u2014anxiously observed the Union lines materialize across their front.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n Around 1:30 pm, a Union bugler sounded the command \u201cforward, double-quick.\u201d Approximately 14,000 Federal soldiers began marching towards Orchard Knob. The 634 rebel defenders provided futile resistance against the blue wave, offering few exchanges of gunfire before scurrying up Missionary Ridge. Shortly before 3:00 pm, General Wood galloped to the summit of Orchard Knob and signaled to General Thomas: \u201cI have taken the first line of enemy entrenchments.\u201d Thomas responded, \u201cHold on; don\u2019t come back; you have got too much; intrench [sic] your position.\u201d Orchard Knob later became General Grant\u2019s forward observation post for his planned attack against Missionary Ridge. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n Bragg was alarmed by the sight of so many Yankees positioned at his front and again made major revisions to his defensive arrangements. Having previously regarded the primary Union objective as Knoxville, Bragg now suspected an imminent assault against Missionary Ridge. He immediately recalled Cleburne and Buckner\u2019s divisions, who were less than a day\u2019s march away in Cleveland, Tennessee. Bragg also withdrew Major General W.H.T. Walker\u2019s division from his left flank to the southern end of Tunnel Hill. In the center, Breckenridge ordered his men to fortify the crest of Missionary Ridge, a practical task that Bragg had somehow neglected for weeks. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n NOVEMBER 24: THE BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n Expecting Sherman to eradicate Bragg from Missionary Ridge, Grant authorized Hooker to move simultaneously against the Confederate positions on Lookout Mountain. Hooker utilized three division for the operation, respectively commanded by Generals John Geary, Charles Cruft, and Peter J. Osterhaus. Hooker was intent to \u201csweep every rebel from [Lookout Mountain]\u201d and left little to chance. During the night of November 23, he arranged nine batteries to pulverize the rebel pickets at dawn. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/wow-image><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/figure>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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