
Introduction
-Asutosh Kar and Diya Ranjith
The traditional criminal justice system perceives crime as violating society’s normative values, prompting the adversarial mechanism to revolve around only the state and the offender. The third stakeholder, the victim, has been relegated to the role of a witness to a crime against the state and is useful only to the extent of furnishing evidence.
However, in recent decades, victims’ participatory rights have gained salience. For instance, after the 2021 Lakhimpur Kheri violence against protesting farmers, bail was granted to the accused after the victims had been disconnected from a virtual hearing. The Supreme Court in Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra set it aside, reasoning that this denied victims’ right to be heard at “every step” after the offence, even if trial had not begun. Internationally, Article 6(b) of the UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime seeks to “facilitate the responsiveness of judicial and administrative processes” to victims’ needs by ensuring consideration of their concerns at appropriate stages. This reckoning aims to avert dissociation from the trial’s outcome and ensure therapeutic benefits such as closure for the victim.
The need for a paradigm shift towards empowerment of victims is frequently cited as a motivation behind the enactment of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. We seek to analyse whether BNSS has truly furthered this goal by examining the changes (or lack thereof) in opportunities to be informed and heard provided to victims before their case is abandoned. Firstly, we shall critique the avenues for a victim to ‘protest’ the police filing a closure report stating that the case need not proceed to trial. Secondly, we shall examine the consideration offered to the victim before a similar action of withdrawal from prosecution is taken by the prosecutor during trial.
Judicially Created, Legislatively Ignored: Protest Petition’s Illusory Accessibility
When the Magistrate receives a police report under §173(2)(i) of the CrPC disclosing no offence, Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner of Police (“Bhagwant Singh”) explained that he could either accept the closure report and drop the proceeding, disagree and proceed, or direct further investigation. In the first scenario where the Magistrate concurs with the police report, and proceedings are stopped, the interests of both the informant as well as the victim would be prejudiced, given the failure of the FIR’s purpose and perceived lack of justice for the injured. Hence, Bhagwant Singh interpreted §173(2)(ii) of the CrPC as obliging the police officer to serve notice of the action taken to the informant, to also allow the informant an opportunity of being heard. He can make his submissions under a “protest petition” to persuade the Magistrate to take cognisance and issue process instead of accepting the closure report.
However, the decision stopped short of extending the same rights to the injured person or the deceased’s relatives (included as “victims” under the BNSS). Hence, where the informant is someone other than the victim, the latter is not entitled to notice from the Magistrate and can only make submissions if he “comes to know” about the closure report on his own. This places a disproportionate burden on the victim, typically a layperson with limited legal awareness, to make themselves aware of the closure report in order to be able to furnish submissions.
While the judiciary has evolved this regime of protest petitions, the purportedly victim-centric BNSS fails to codify this right and extend it statutorily to victims. The new code reproduces CrPC’s §173(2)(ii) as §193(3)(iii), [SCE1] continuing the obligation to communicate the police’s final action only to the informant. BNSS adds the term “victim” only under §193(3)(ii), mandating the officer to inform the informant and the victim of the progress of the investigation within 90 days. This right, albeit pertinent, assumes a passive character as it does not allow for the victim’s active participation in the same manner as a protest petition.
Further, even if a victim seeks to protest the closure, the procedure ahead poses several hindrances. When the Magistrate accepts the protest petition and wishes to proceed with the case, he generally does so by taking cognisance of the same police report that had sought closure. This does not provide an opportunity for victims to present their own witnesses and have their statements recorded to disclose details potentially suppressed or ignored by the police. This would be permitted if the Magistrate treated the protest petition as a complaint and took cognisance of the same. While empowered to do so, it requires the victim to satisfy the ingredients necessary to constitute a complaint. It is not enough if a victim only prays for the rejection of the closure report in his petition. He also has to reiterate the allegations made in the original complaint/FIR and pray specifically for further action by the court. Adherence to these technicalities is challenging for victims, especially those from marginalised communities, making their petition less likely to be considered a complaint.
The next layer of difficulty arises once a protest petition is rejected on merits. A second protest petition is not maintainable if it is based on almost identical facts. In fact, if the second petition does raise fresh evidence, the court can still dismiss it if this “could have been procured earlier”. This standard effectively reverses the burden of investigative failure onto the victim, who has to prove not only that the investigation was deficient, but also that they were incapable of accessing the relevant facts at an earlier stage.
Prior to 2013, victims in England and Wales had to similarly undertake judicial review of a non-prosecution decision. Taking note of the substantial financial and procedural costs, the Victims’ Right to Review Scheme was introduced to allow applying for an internal re-assessment within the police authorities without having to satisfy the difficult standards in court proceedings. The BNSS already provides for such layered remedies in analogous contexts. For instance, where an FIR’s registration is refused, the complainant must first approach the Superintendent of Police and thereafter take recourse to the Magistrate. In the absence of a similar mechanism to challenge the closure report before a senior investigatory authority, victims are directly thrust into the technical and adversarial terrain of protest petitions.
Having established the inadequacy of victims’ participatory rights at the investigative stage, the next section analyses its effectiveness during trial.
A Victim’s Right to Be Heard, Not Heeded: BNSS’s Hollow Reform To Withdrawal Of Prosecution
§321 of the CrPC provides that a prosecution can be withdrawn by an application filed by the Public Prosecutor and with the court’s consent. The BNSS, in §360, adds a proviso mandating that the victim to be heard before the court grants permission.
However, even this explicit inclusion creates a façade of inclusivity. It remains silent regarding the procedure after the court accepts the victim’s opposition to withdrawal. §360 neither empowers the victim to seek substitution of the prosecutor, nor does it trigger the appointment of a special prosecutor. Hence, dismissing the plea to withdraw leaves a reluctant prosecutor in charge of producing witnesses, examining evidence, and the overall conduct of a case.
Furthermore, the proviso grants a superficial right of ‘expression’, only allowing the victim to supply information to the court in a one-directional flow. §360 does not require the prosecutor to consult the victim before deciding to withdraw, nor does it oblige the court to record reasons responding to the victim’s objections. A more effective mode of participation would be ‘consultation’ wherein victims’ preferences are sought and specifically addressed in the final decision made, establishing a bidirectional flow.
Without this structure, firstly, a broad discretionary power continues to be vested in the Prosecutor. He can seek to withdraw from prosecution on a range of grounds: juridical, such as paucity of evidence, but also non-juridical factors such as “furthering the broad ends of justice, public order, and tranquillity”. Therefore, vague justifications that can be readily established by a Prosecutor, such as a “social purpose” and “interests of the administration of justice” are often accepted by courts. The BNSS fails to incorporate qualifications to this discretion, leaving this power largely unchecked. In such circumstances, prosecutors such as those handling Mohammed Akhlaq’s lynching may continue to deny the victims justice using false and overbroad excuses potentially masked by the executive’s political considerations.
Secondly, the judiciary’s jurisdiction continues to be highly restricted. The Magistrate, while granting or refusing consent, is only supposed to perform a supervisory, not adjudicatory, function. He only considers whether there are blatant illegalities, carrying no onus to give a detailed reasoned order. The minority in Sheonandan Paswan v State of Bihar rightly cautioned against this mechanical exercise of judicial function and took the view that the Magistrate must not only satisfy themselves that the grounds are relevant to public justice, but also analyse whether the grounds in fact are satisfactorily established. Hence, victims cannot be effectively heard without empowering the Magistrate to undertake a detailed examination of the sufficiency of material and obliging him to record reasons for granting consent. The BNSS attaches only a symbolic, not holistic and structural, importance to victim empowerment.
Conclusion
We have demonstrated how, despite reformist rhetoric, the BNSS largely preserves the marginalisation of victims at two critical junctures: the police’s decision to close a case and the prosecutor’s decision to withdraw it. By importing the silence on protest petitions, the BNSS complicitly omits the requirement of notice to the victim and imposes onerous technical requirements. Even the inclusion of the victim’s hearing during withdrawal of prosecution proves illusory without qualifying prosecutorial discretion or expanding judicial scrutiny. This lack of meaningful participation under the BNSS risks ‘secondary victimisation’ wherein the criminal justice system inflicts additional harm on the victim instead of allowing him to actualise justice.
The authors are third-year law students at National Law School of India University, Bengaluru.